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We evaluate the labor market and distributional effects of an increase in the
early retirement age (ERA) from 60 to 63 for women. We use a regression dis-
continuity design which exploits the immediate increase in the ERA between
women born in 1951 and 1952. The analysis is based on the German micro
census which includes about 370,000 households per year. We focus on het-
erogeneous labor market effects on the individual and on the household level
and we study the distributional implications using net household income. In
this respect we extend the previous literature which mainly studied employ-
ment effects on the individual level. Our results show sizable labor market
effects which strongly differ by subgroups. We document larger employment
effects for women who cannot rely on other income on the household level,
e.g. women with a low income partner. The distributional analysis shows
on average no significant effects on female or household income. This result
holds as well for heterogeneous groups: Even for the most vulnerable groups,
such as single women, women without higher education, or low partner in-
come, we do not find significant reductions in income. One reason for this
result is program substitution.
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1. Introduction
Aging populations challenge public pension systems. Therefore, since the 1990s, most
OECD countries have reversed their retirement policies and started to encourage longer
working lives, thus alleviating the decline of the working age population. Reforms include
tighter qualifying conditions and increases in the early retirement age (ERA), the intro-
duction of actuarial deductions for early retirement, increases in the normal retirement
age (NRA), i.e. the age at which people can first draw full benefits without actuarial
deductions,1 increases in the statutory retirement age (SRA), or a combination of these
policies.
A large empirical literature analyzes labor market effects of various pension reforms.2
Most of these studies use administrative social security data and exploit the quasi-
experimental variation induced by pension reforms to estimate causal labor market ef-
fects. Administrative data have the advantage of providing accurate information about
the working and earnings history of large samples or even the entire population. Yet, in
general, social security data primarily include individual information and, therefore, it
is not possible to study effects of pension reforms on the household level. Consequently,
with individual data it is not possible to analyze spill-over effects of pension reforms on
spousal employment, i.e. the added worker effect, and to focus on heterogeneous effects
of the pension reform by household composition, spousal employment, or by household
income. Moreover based on individual data, distributional analyses of pension reforms
are only partially informative since other sources of income on the household level, most
importantly the spousal income, cannot be considered. However, in order to evaluate
the employment effects and, in particular, the distributional consequences of pension
reforms, it is important to consider the heterogeneity along the household dimensions.
More specifically, when designing and reforming the pension system it is important to
understand which groups respond to pension reforms and how household net income –
across the income distribution and for specific vulnerable groups – is affected.
Therefore, in this paper, we focus, in addition to the individual level on the household
level, and quantify potential spill-over effects on spousal employment, heterogeneous
employment effects and distributional consequences induced by an increase in the ERA.
For identification of these effects, we follow Geyer and Welteke (2017) and exploit the
1This definition of the NRA is equal to the OECD definition of the “pensionable age”.
2Examples are Krueger and Pischke (1992); Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007); Mastrobuoni (2009);
Coe and Haverstick (2010); Hanel and Riphahn (2012); Staubli and Zweimüller (2013); Vestad (2013);
Atalay and Barrett (2015); Brinch, Vestad, and Zweimüller (2015); Lalive and Staubli (2015); Hernæs,
Markussen, Piggott, and Røed (2016); Manoli and Weber (2016); Oguzoglu, Polidano, and Vu (2016);
Engels, Geyer, and Haan (2017); Geyer and Welteke (2017).
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exogenous variation of the 1999 pension reform in Germany, which abolished the old-age
pension for women. This reform meant that women born in 1951 could still go into
early retirement at age 60, while women born in 1952 would not be able to retire early
until 63. The reform is especially interesting due to its intensity (three year increase) and
immediateness (direct cutoff and no monthly lags). The arbitrary assignment around the
cutoff allows to credibly identify causal effects using a Regression Discontinuity Design
(RDD). In contrast to Geyer and Welteke (2017), we do not make use of the individual
administrative data from the German pension insurance. Instead we use repeated cross
sections from the German micro census, which every year provides information for 1%
of all German households (about 370,000 households). Thus, this data allows for going
beyond the analysis on the individual level and to also focus on the effects of the pension
reform on the household level. Crucially, the micro census includes enough observations
to apply a credible identification strategy, even for subgroups.
In the first part of the empirical analysis, we use a RDD to evaluate the labor market
effects for women and spill-over effects on spousal employment. We concentrate on several
different outcome variables, namely employment, retirement, unemployment, and non-
employment. We quantify the average employment effect for the full population and
focus on different subsamples to investigate effect heterogeneity of the pension reform
on the individual and household levels. In particular, we study the effects by education,
household composition, as well as by the employment status and spousal earnings. In the
second part, we use the same empirical design and analyze the distributional implications
of the pension reform for the different subgroups. We estimate the effect of the reform
on female income and on net household income.
In addition to the mentioned literature on the employment effects of pension reforms,
our paper is related to studies that focus on retirement behavior in the household context.
For example Blau (1998); Gustman and Steinmeier (2000); Michaud and Vermeulen
(2011) estimate structural retirement models and show that complementarities in spouses’
leisure are a likely explanation for joint retirement behavior. Other studies use exogenous
variation in pension age rules or incentives to identify joint retirement behavior in couples
(e.g. Banks, Blundell, and Casanova, 2010; Stancanelli and van Soest, 2012; Atalay and
Barrett, 2016; Lalive and Parrotta, 2017; Selin, 2017). The findings of this literature
are mixed, yet most studies find larger spill over effects for women than for men. As
mentioned above, in general household information is missing in administrative data sets
which are used for the analysis of pension reforms. At the same time household surveys
often have too few observations for credible identification of causal effects. Therefore,
only few studies focus on heterogeneous employment effects of pension reforms on the
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household level. One notable exemption is Cribb, Emmerson, and Tetlow (2016). They
focus on the gradual increase in the ERA over several cohorts for women in the UK using
the labor force survey. They find no significant differences by marital status, age of the
partner, or housing wealth. Finally, our study is linked to the growing literature which
quantifies how economic shocks, such as unemployment or disability, can be reduced or
partially insured in the household context, see e.g. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-
Eksten (2016), Autor, Kostøl, and Mogstad (2015) or Haan and Prowse (2015).
The clean identification strategy exploiting the immediate increase in the ERA from age
60 to 63 between two adjacent cohorts in combination with the large and rich household
data from the micro census allow us to extend the previous literature. In line with Geyer
and Welteke (2017), we find that raising the ERA leads on average to a sharp reduction
in retirement, to positive employment effects, and to an increase in unemployment and
inactivity. In addition, our study provides several novel results on the individual and
household levels. First, we do not find significant spillover effects of the reform on male
employment behavior. This is consistent with previous studies that document sizable and
significant spillover or added work effects for women but not for men, see e.g. Lalive and
Parrotta (2017). Second, we document important heterogeneity of labor market effects.
At the individual level, we find both highly educated women and single women to have
larger employment effects. Importantly, we also document remarkable heterogeneity
with respect to household characteristics. Women with retired or low income partners
have the largest employment effects. These heterogeneous results can be explained by
better labor market perspectives and working conditions or by different labor market
attachment for highly educated women. Moreover, the income effect on the household
level, provided by the partners’ income, is an important factor explaining the women’s
reaction to the reform. Finally, our distributional analysis shows that on average there
are no significant effects of the reform on individual or household income. This results
holds as well for heterogenous groups: Even for the most vulnerable groups, such as
single households, women without high education, or low partner income, we do not find
significant reductions in income. One reason for this result is program substitution. For
women without high education we find a significant effect of the increase in the ERA on
transfer receipt.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview about the insti-
tutional context of the German public pension system and describes details of the 1999
pension reform. In the following section, we describe the data and show descriptive statis-
tics of the estimation sample. Section 4 explains the empirical methods and assumptions
we use to identify the causal effect of an increase in the retirement age. Sections 5 and 6
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show the findings of our empirical analysis of labor market outcomes and income. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2. Institutional background
2.1. The German public pension system
The statutory public pension system covers most private and public sector employees3
and provides old-age pensions, disability pensions, and survivors benefits. The system is
financed by a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme and has a strong contributory link: pension
benefits depend on the entire working history. In principle, old-age pensions are propor-
tional to lifetime labor earnings. Entitlements can also be acquired during periods of
unemployment, for child raising, and for informal care provision.
For the cohorts we consider in this study, women born in 1951 and 1952, there exist
four pathways into early retirement, i.e. claiming retirement benefits before reaching
the NRA: (1) the pension for women; (2) the invalidity pension; (3) the pension after
unemployment or after old-age part-time work ; and (4) the pension for the long-term
insured.
The first two of these pathways, the pension for women and the invalidity pension,
allow drawing benefits starting from 60 years of age.4 The other two early retirement
programs allow retirement starting from age 63. The pension for the long-term insured
enables individuals with particularly long insurance records of at least 35 years to retire
early. The calculation of pension benefits does not differ across these pathways, however
early retirement is associated with deductions of 0.3% per month before the NRA. Table
1 summarizes the changes in retirement and labor market rules.
3The public pension system covers more than 80% of the workforce with the exceptions of groups that
are not subject to compulsory insurance: civil servants, most self-employed, and low income workers
(“geringfügige Beschäftigung”).
4Individuals who are not able to work due to severe health conditions can retire before the age of 60
through the disability pension program. Note that the German pension system provides two different
types of pensions due to impaired health. The disability pension (“Erwerbsminderungsrente”) is
similar to disability benefits in the US. Eligibility for full benefits requires that an individual is
unable to work more than 3 hours a day for at least six months. Eligibility for partial disability
benefits require that the individual is unable to work more than 6 hours a day. In addition, eligibility
requires 5 years of contributions. It is the only pension that is available prior to turning 60. When
reaching the NRA the disability pension is converted into an old-age pension of the same amount. In
addition, there is the aforementioned invalidity pension (“Rente wegen Schwerbehinderung”) that is
available from age 60 for people with a severe disability status under German law. Eligibility requires
a degree of disability of 50% or more and does not require work incapacity. The ERA of this pension
has been increased since 2012.
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Table 1: Changes in retirement labor market rules by cohort
Labor market status Differences in rules by birth cohort
1951 1952
Retirement
Pension for women The ERA for women fulfilling el-
igibility criteria is 60 (with per-
manent deductions; 0.3% per
month retiring before the NRA
of 65). Maximal deductions
amount to 18%.
abolished
Invalidity pension The ERA for women fulfilling el-
igibility criteria is 60 (with per-
manent deductions; 0.3% per
month retiring before the NRA
of 63). Maximal deductions
amount to 10.8%.
ERA and NRA increase simul-
taneously by one month per
month-of-birth cohort for women
born between January and June
1952. ERA and NRA remain
constant at 60 + 6 months and
63 + 6 months for women born
between July and December.
Disability pension no change
Unemployment benefits
ALG I (short-terms benefits) no change
ALG II (long-term benefits) no change
Inactivity no change
Employment no change
Notes: The table shows changes in relevant retirement and labor market rules for cohorts 1951 and 1952. Note
that the pension after unemployment or after old-age part-time work was also abolished for women born after
1951. However, the ERA of this pension was 63 and we focus on women age 60 to 62.
2.2. The 1999 pension reform
The 1999 reform abolished the pension for women for cohorts born after 1951. Effectively,
the reform raised the ERA for most women to at least 63.5 Women born before 1952
could claim the pension for women if they fulfilled certain qualifying conditions. The
eligibility criteria were: (i) at least 15 years of pension insurance contributions; and (ii)
at least 10 years of pension insurance contributions after the age of 40. These criteria
ensured a minimum labor market attachment of eligible women. According to Geyer
and Welteke (2017), about 60% of all women born in 1951 were eligible for the old-age
pension for women. Due to the reform, women born in 1952 lose an important option
5The pension after unemployment or after old-age part-time work was abolished at the same time as
the pension for women. However, this does not affect our analysis, as the ERA for this pension type
was already 63.
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to exit the labor market before age 63.6 At age 63, people with a long insurance record
can retire with deductions. As explained above, the only remaining retirement pathway
before age 63 is the invalidity pension. The ERA (60) and the NRA (63) of the invalidity
pension was increased by one month per month-of-birth cohort for women born between
January and June 1952; for women born between July and December 1952 ERA and
NRA for the invalidity pension were 60 + 6 months and 63 + 6 months, respectively.[JO
According to the data of the (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2017) the claiming behavior
for the invalidity pension in the years under study did not change: Between 2010 and
2014 about 7 to 8% of all new female retirees used this pathway. This is not surprising
since even before the 1999 reform, if women had the choice between the invalidity pension
or the pension for women, the former was more attractive because of a lower NRA and
lower deductions.
As a results of these pension reforms, the remaining options for women born after 1951
to exit the labor market before age 63, are unemployment benefits, disability pensions,
or inactivity. Geyer and Welteke (2017) discuss in detail the potential employment and
substitution effects of an increase in the ERA. First, given the strong interdependence
between unemployment benefits and pensions in Germany, see e.g. Engels, Geyer, and
Haan (2017), an increase in the ERA is likely to affect the take-up of unemployment
benefits in two ways: individuals have an increased incentive to postpone entry into un-
employment. This would lead to a shift in increased unemployment entry from 58 (cohort
1951) to 61 (cohort 1952) years, i.e. 24 months before reaching the cohort-specific ERA,
since the maximum entitlement for unemployment is two years. In addition, unemploy-
ment rates among 60 to 63 year-old women may increase due to program substitution
because of the abolishment of the early retirement option, i.e. women who want to exit
employment between the old and new ERA must take another path to exit the labor
market. Second, substitution into the disability pension, the only pathway to retirement
before reaching the ERA, could be possible. However, in Germany, health-related eligibil-
ity criteria for disability pensions are relatively strict, especially since a reform in 2001.7
Therefore, using disability pensions as a pathway to a regular old-age pension is difficult
and not typically an attractive option. Moreover, since 2001, actuarial deductions also
apply to this type of pension. The pension is permanently reduced by 0.3% per month if
retiring before the NRA. Third, women who are neither eligible for disability pension nor
unemployment benefits may choose inactivity, i.e. exit the labor force without benefit
receipt.
6In 2011 about 40% of all new female retirees used the pathway pension for women (Deutsche Renten-
versicherung, 2017).




For our analysis, we use the German micro census, which is a representative annual survey
with roughly 370,000 German households and 830,000 persons per year, corresponding
to a 1% sample of the German population.8 To cover the most relevant period for
the cohorts around the introduction of the 1999 pension reform, we use repeated cross
sectional micro censuses for the years 2011 – 2015. Over this period, we can observe the
labor market status and retirement of women born in 1951 and 1952 for the ages 60 to
62.
The micro census is well suited for our analysis. First, the sample size is large, in
particular compared to other survey-based data sets that can be used to study the effect
of pension reforms at the household level. The large number of observations allows us to
restrict the sample to cohorts around the cutoff of the reform. Thus, treatment and con-
trol groups are very homogeneous, i.e. their birth dates differ only by one year. This is
important for a convincing identification strategy of the treatment effect. Moreover, with
such a large sample size it is possible to robustly identify the effects for heterogeneous
subsamples, which is the central focus of our analysis. Second, the micro census includes
rich information about all household members, including marital status, household in-
come, as well as individual information about employment, education, and income of all
household members. As mentioned above, this information is usually not available in
administrative data which have been previously used to estimate the employment effects
of pension reforms on the individual level, e.g. Geyer and Welteke (2017).
The micro census does not include information about the working history. Therefore,
we cannot observe whether an individual fulfills the eligibility criteria for drawing early
retirement benefits (the pension for women requires at least 15 years of employment and
at least 10 of those after the age of 40). Thus, instead of estimating the average treatment
effect (ATE) of the reform, we estimate the intent to treat effect (ITT).9
8The survey started in 1957 and contains a broad range of individual and household information,
including detailed socioeconomic characteristics. The data are available as repeated cross-sections
and were accessed in the research data center of the Statistical Office Berlin-Brandenburg. The
micro census is part of the official statistics in Germany and selected individuals are legally required to
participate. For more information about the data, see e.g. Destatis (2018) and FDZ der Statistischen
Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2017).
9Geyer and Welteke (2017) show that around 60% of all women born in 1951 and 1952 are eligible
for the specific pathway into retirement. Further, comparing the ITT and the ATE, they show that
scaling the ITT estimates with this fraction is very close to the ATE.
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3.2. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive evidence about the outcome variables and the main individ-
ual and household characteristics for the estimation sample of women aged 60–62 born
in 1951 and 1952.10 In the first panel, we focus on the labor market outcomes. We
distinguish between four labor market states: retirement, employment, unemployment,
and inactivity. We define an individual as retired if she receives pension benefits from
the German pension insurance. The category employment consists of individuals in paid
work who do not receive pension benefits. Unemployment includes all individuals who
are neither employed nor retired and receive out of work transfers11 and the remaining
non-employed and non-retired individuals are classified as inactive. The shares in the
different employment states strongly vary between the two cohorts. This is first evidence
for a strong effect of the pension reform. More specifically, about 36% of all women aged
60-62 born in 1951 are classified as retired. For women born from 1952, the pension
reform closes the most important pathway to retirement before the age of 63. Therefore,
the share is reduced to about 18% of all women; these women receive disability or inva-
lidity pensions, which are the only pathways to retirement before the age of 63 for women
born after 1951, see Table 1. In contrast, the share of employment, unemployment, and
inactivity is higher among the women born in 1952. Employment rates of women born
in 1952 are about 10 percentage points higher, the share in unemployment increases by
almost 2 percentage points and inactivity increases by about 6 percentage points.
In the second part of Table 2 we present income information that is the outcome
for the distributional analysis. The micro census includes information about individual
and household net income.12 The data show that despite the sizable differences in the
employment states, both the individual and the household income, are similar for women
from the two cohorts.
In the two last panels, we present individual and household specific characteristics for
the two cohorts. As expected, age, educational outcomes, the share in couple house-
holds13, the share of women in West Germany, as well as household specific variables
10We exclude civil servants and self employed women because they are, in most cases, exempt from the
mandatory public pension insurance.
11Out of work transfers comprise unemployment benefits (ALG) and means-tested welfare benefits (ALG
II/social benefits, according to Hartz IV).
12Income variables are only recorded in brackets in the micro census. To generate approximate contin-
uous variables, we assume that everyone in the respective income bracket receives the mean of the
respective lower and upper bound of the income bracket. This procedure is used analogously for all
income measures (household, individual, partner income). The income measure includes all sources
of income including transfers net of taxes.
13Couple households include married and non-married couples. In the micro census, couples can only
be linked if they actually share a household and live together. Thus, we do not capture couples who
9
such as the partner’s income and employment state or the age difference between the
spouses are very similar for women born in 1951 and 1952. This similarity is important
for the identification strategy proposed in the following section. Finally, note that for
each cohort, we observe over 11,000 women, thus the main specification in the empirical
analysis is based on more than 22,000 observations.








Own income (per Month in Euro) 933 947
Household income (per Month in Euro) 2,365 2,470
Individual characteristics
Age 61 61





Partner income 1,788 1,894
Age gap -2.726 -2.753
Partner retired .551 .536
Partner employed .341 .358
Partner unemployed .036 .037
Partner inactive .073 .069
Number of observations 11,192 11,315
Number of observations partners 7,852 7,989
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder,
Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
Descriptive statistics are shown for the estimation sample of 60–62 year old women.
Retired = receiving retirement benefits from German Pension Insurance. Employed
= in employment, not retired. Non-employed = neither retired, nor employed. Un-
employed = non-employed, with ALG/ALGII. Inactive = non-employed, without
ALG/ALGII. Education classification based on ISCED (low: ISCED 1* and 2*,
medium: ISCED 3* and 4*, high: ISCED 5* and higher). Age gap: female - male age
in couple. Income values have been imputed from categorical variables. Children:
Indicator for non-married children living in household.
4. Empirical strategy
For the estimation of the labor market effects of the increase in the ERA and the distri-
butional analysis, we follow Geyer and Welteke (2017) and exploit the variation induced
live in separate places, which is a very small share of all couples.
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by the 1999 pension reform in a regression discontinuity design.14 The research design is
implemented by the following empirical model:
yi = α+ βDi + γ0f(zi − c) + γ1Dif(zi − c) +X
′
i
δ + ǫi, (1)
where β captures the effect of the pension reform and indicator Di = 1, if the individual
was born on or after January 1, 1952. The month of birth zi enters the empirical model
in difference to the reform cutoff c, which is January 1952. In our baseline specifications,
we include a linear trend in the running variable, f(zi − c) = zi − c. The specification
allows for different slopes before and after the cutoff. In a robustness check, we replicate
the results using a quadratic trend in the running variable. Additional control variables
(summarized in Xi) include partnership status, number of children, educational informa-
tion, information about region, nationality, and age effects. For couples, we also include
the age gap between partners.15
In the empirical analyses, we focus on different outcome variables yi. We concentrate
on retirement, employment, unemployment, and inactivity of women to describe the
labor market effects. In addition, we analyze potential spillover effects for the spouse,
estimating the effect on employment and retirement of men in a couple with a woman
born in years 1951 or 1952. For the distributional analysis, we study the effect on
individual and household net income. The central aim of this study is to understand the
heterogeneous effects of the pension reform by individual and household characteristics.
Therefore, in addition to estimations using the full sample, we conduct separate analyses
for sub-groups defined by central individual and household characteristics.
5. Results – labor market effects
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis of labor market outcomes.
In the first part, we focus on the average labor market effects of the pension reform.
Then, we analyze potential spillover effects of the pension reforms on the labor market
outcomes of male partners. Finally, we investigate heterogeneous patterns of the labor
14Geyer and Welteke (2017) provide detailed evidence that the identifying assumptions for this research
design are fulfilled. First, it is impossible to manipulate the treatment assignment variable, which is
the month of birth. Second, Geyer and Welteke (2017) show that other policy changes cannot explain
differences between the 1951 and 1952 cohorts. Third, as documented in Table 2, the observable
characteristics of women born in the two adjacent cohorts are very similar.
15We do not include the partner’s retirement status or partner’s income as they might be potentially
endogenous because of spillover effects. In a robustness check (not reported), we included these
variables which did not affect the results of the central outcome. This is consistent with our results
of no significant spillover effects discussed in Table 5.
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market effects across different sub-samples. This allows us not just to shed light on
potentially differential individual reactions to the reform by important individual and




We begin with a graphical analysis of the average labor market effects. Figure 1 shows
the average share in retirement, employment, unemployment, and inactivity by birth
months 24 month before and after the cut-off (January, 1st, 1952).16 The retirement
rate drops sharply from nearly 40% to around 20% at the first birth month (January
1952) that is affected by the pension reform.17 Roughly half of this 20 percentage point
drop in retirement is reflected in a sharp increase in the employment rate post-reform.
The remaining half of the drop in retirement increases unemployment and inactivity. As
the lower panel of Figure 1 shows, the effect on inactivity exceeds the small increase in
unemployment in the affected cohorts.
The cohort trends on both sides of the reform cutoff show that women born in later
cohorts are more strongly attached to the labor market. The employment rate before and
after the cutoff increases by roughly 10 percentage points from the oldest to the youngest
cohorts in the respective two-birth year window. Similarly, retirement and inactivity are
overall downward sloping. In the estimation analysis based on the RDD, we control for
these cohort trends in the labor market.
16Note that the graphical analysis includes observations of women born two years around the cutoff
to display the overall trend in labor market outcomes on both sides of the discontinuity. The main
regression analysis only includes observations of women born in 1951 and in 1952 in order to keep
the treated and control groups as similar as possible
17As mentioned above, the group of retirees not only consists of regular old age pensioners, but also
includes invalidity pensioners and old age pensioners in disability pensions. These retirement schemes
are available before the age of 63. Therefore, the post-reform retirement rate does not drop to zero
at the reform cutoff.
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Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
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5.1.2. Regression results
We now turn to the estimation results of the ITT effect using the RDD (see Equation 1).
The main results are displayed in Table 3. We show the results for the four labor market
outcomes in two different specifications. Specification I only includes the treatment
indicator and a linear trend in the running variable that is allowed to differ on both
sides of the cut-off. In addition, Specification II controls for individual and household
characteristics.
Our results confirm the findings in Geyer and Welteke (2017): the pension reform has a
sizable effect on labor market outcomes. On average, the effect on retirement for women
aged 60-62 amounts to about 16 percentage points, which is an increase of close to 50%
relative to the pre policy mean of 36%. This point estimate is highly significant and does
not substantially change after controlling for individual and household characteristics.
Our results imply that the pension reform leads to a positive average employment effect
of about 8.4 percentage points. The effect is slightly smaller (7.5 percentage points) in
the base specification without control variables. In the last four columns of Table 3 we
turn to the effect on unemployment and inactivity. We find positive effects for both labor
market states; the effect on inactivity (6 percentage points) is larger than the effect on
unemployment (2 percentage points). The effects on unemployment and inactivity only
increase slightly if we drop the additional control variables.
The estimated linear trends before and after January 1952 are insignificant. This is
not surprising since we use a homogeneous sample of women, born in two adjacent years.
When we increase the window and include women born in cohorts 1950 - 1953 (see
Table A.2 in Appendix) the time trends are significant for retirement and employment,
which is in line with the graphical analysis (Figure 1). The estimated coefficients of the
remaining control variables are in line with expectations. For instance, single women and
women with higher education have higher employment rates. Further, employment rates
decrease with age. Finally, we find sizable differences between women in East and West
Germany. Most important retirement rates are markedly higher in the East since East
German women, on average, have longer employment histories and are more likely to be
entitled to the women’s pension.
Robustness Check for average labor market effects
In the Appendix, we present results of additional regressions using quadratic or cubic
time trends (Table A.1) and including women born in cohorts 1950 - 1953 (Table A.2).
Overall, the point estimates of the treatment variable only slightly differ from the results
14
Table 3: Treatment effects main specification
Employed Retired Unemployed Inactive
I II I II I II I II
Treatment 0.0748∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗ -0.1634∗∗∗ -0.1608∗∗∗ 0.0184∗∗ 0.0170∗∗ 0.0703∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0173) (0.0163)
Running variable 0.0018 0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0013 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0003
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Running × Treatment 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0012 0.0007 0.0001
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Single 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ -0.1311∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0086) (0.0074) (0.0075)
Age gap × couple 0.0069∗∗∗ -0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0011)
Children -0.0005 -0.0517∗∗∗ -0.0020 0.0542∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0053) (0.0146)
High education 0.1631∗∗∗ -0.0612∗∗∗ -0.0381∗∗∗ -0.0638∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0094) (0.0048) (0.0083)
West 0.0267∗ -0.1148∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗ 0.1420∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0180) (0.0081) (0.0044)
Age 61 -0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0476∗∗∗ -0.0080∗∗ -0.0024
(0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0036) (0.0033)
Age 62 -0.0845∗∗∗ 0.1015∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ -0.0025
(0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0040) (0.0060)
German 0.1457∗∗∗ 0.0088 -0.0691∗∗∗ -0.0855∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0160) (0.0185)
Constant 0.4299∗∗∗ 0.2854∗∗∗ 0.3496∗∗∗ 0.3774∗∗∗ 0.0629∗∗∗ 0.1677∗∗∗ 0.1576∗∗∗ 0.1695∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0264) (0.0132) (0.0228) (0.0043) (0.0168) (0.0076) (0.0245)
X Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507
Pre-policy mean .42 .42 .36 .36 .06 .06 .17 .17
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗: 0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01. Unemployed =
non-employed, with ALG/ALGII. Inactive = non-employed, without ALG/ALGII.
obtained in the main specification. In addition, we provide further supporting evidence
for the identification assumptions using placebo tests. More specifically, we estimate the
main specification, but we impose the reform cutoff artificially to January 1951 or to
January 1953. Since the pension reform affected cohorts from January 1952, we should
not see any significant treatment effect in these placebo tests. The results of this exercise
are displayed in Table 4. As expected, the estimated placebo effects are all insignificant
and the point estimates are very close to zero.18
5.2. Spillover effect on male labor market outcomes
While studies document sizable spillover effects of pension reforms on female employ-
ment, the sign and the magnitude of spillover effects for male partners is less clear. As
mentioned in the introduction, most studies find insignificant results. For example Lalive
18Note, that the smaller sample size in these placebo regressions is due to the age restrictions we put in
order to achieve an age balanced sample. The placebo test 1951 only includes age 61 and 62, whereas
the placebo test 1953 only includes women aged 60 and 61.
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Table 4: Placebo reforms
Employed Retired Unemployed Inactive
Placebo reform 1951
Placebo treatment 1951 -0.0155 0.0212 -0.0032 -0.0025
(0.0143) (0.0158) (0.0076) (0.0145)
Running variable 1951 0.0051∗∗∗ -0.0044∗∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Running × Treatment 1951 -0.0025 0.0021 0.0011 -0.0007
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0018)
Observations 14,998 14,998 14,998 14,998
Placebo reform 1953
Placebo treatment 1953 0.0086 -0.0098 -0.0060 0.0072
(0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0064) (0.0170)
Running variable 1953 0.0017 -0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0008
(0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0016)
Running × Treatment 1953 0.0013 -0.0010 0.0013 -0.0017
(0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0024)
Observations 14,997 14,997 14,997 14,997
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozen-
sus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
For the placebo tests, the cohort affected by the reform is artificially set to 1951 or 1953,
respectively. The placebo test 1951 only includes age groups 61 and 62 from cohorts 1950-
1951. The placebo test 1953 only includes women aged 60 and 61 from cohorts 1952-1953.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗:
0.10, ∗∗: 0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01. Unemployed = non-employed, with ALG/ALGII. Inactive = non-
employed, without ALG/ALGII.
All regressions include partnership/marital status, age gap (× couple), non-married children
in household (0/1), high education (0/1), west Germany, German, age fixed effects, and a
constant.
and Parrotta (2017) for Switzerland show that only women react to retirement of the
partner. Similarly, Selin (2017) does not find any spillover effect on male spouses in Swe-
den. In contrast, Atalay and Barrett (2016) find sizable spillover effects for both men
and women in Australia. The specific result for Australia is consistent with the pension
rules in this country.19
To estimate potential spillover effects for men in Germany, we exploit the increase
in the ERA for women. Specifically, we use the same econometric model as in the
previous analysis (Equation 1), however instead of female labor market outcome we
study the effect on labor market outcomes of the partner. Our estimates reject spillover
effects of the pension reform. In Table 5, we show that the partners’ labor market
outcomes do not react significantly to the increase in the female ERA. Specifically, the
point estimates suggest a small decrease in retirement and a very small increases in
employment, unemployment, and inactivity. However, these effects are all insignificant.
19Pensions are non-contributory and eligibility is not tied to the prior work history. Moreover, in
contrast to most other countries, pensions are means-tested on household income. This creates
financial incentives for spillover effects for couples who are eligible to benefits.
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Table 5: Labor market status of male partner
Partner retired Partner employed Partner unemployed Partner inactive
Treatment -0.0232 0.0105 0.0090 0.0036
(0.0195) (0.0113) (0.0067) (0.0098)
Running variable 0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0010∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0004) (0.0012)
Running × Treatment -0.0026 0.0034∗ 0.0008 -0.0015
(0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0015)
Observations 15,841 15,841 15,841 15,841
Pre-policy mean .551 .341 .036 .073
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calcu-
lations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗: 0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01.
All regressions include a linear trend which can be different on each side of the discontinuity, age gap in couple, non-
married children in household (0/1), high education (0/1), West German, German, age fixed effects, and a constant.
The insignificant spillover effect is important for the interpretation of the heterogeneous
employment effects on the household level. Our findings imply that male employment
status and male earnings are not affected by the pension reform and are exogenous.
Therefore, we can stratify the sample by partners’ employment and earnings in order
to estimate the causal reform effect separately for women with retired and not retired
partners as well as by the partners’ earnings.
5.3. Heterogeneity analysis
The documented average labor market effects of the 1999 pension reform might disguise
heterogeneous effects for specific subgroups that are central to understanding the impli-
cations of the change in the pension rules. In particular, it is important to quantify how
the change in employment, unemployment, and inactivity, i.e. the substitution effects,
differ between socio-demographic groups and by financial resources of the household.
Therefore, we present the estimation results of Equation 1 for the female labor mar-
ket outcomes by subgroups, first on the individual level (Table 6) and second on the
household level (Tables 7 and 8).
We show, in Table 6, in addition to the average effect, heterogeneous results by the
marital status and female education. We only present the treatment effects for the differ-
ent outcomes and the respective pre-policy means. All specifications include additional
covariates and linear time trends before and after January 1952. The results provide
first evidence of important heterogeneity of the substitution effects. Overall, retirement
effects are comparable; for all groups we find negative and sizable retirement effects. The
effects are slightly higher for women in couples and for women without higher education,
yet the pre-policy means for these groups are also higher. Thus, the reform partially
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effects by individual characteristics
Sample Main Singles Couples High educ. Not high educ.
Retirement
Treatment -0.1608∗∗∗ -0.1292∗∗∗ -0.1745∗∗∗ -0.1302∗∗∗ -0.1673∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.0214) (0.0155) (0.0196) (0.0172)
Observations 22,507 6,666 15,841 3,489 19,018
Pre-Policy Mean .36 .35 .36 .32 .36
Employment
Treatment 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0872∗∗∗ 0.0951∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0364) (0.0195)
Observations 22,507 6,666 15,841 3,489 19,018
Pre-Policy Mean .42 .47 .4 .55 .39
Unemployment
Treatment 0.0170∗∗ 0.0298 0.0126∗ 0.0121 0.0188∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0206) (0.0063) (0.0103) (0.0080)
Observations 22,507 6,666 15,841 3,489 19,018
Pre-Policy Mean .06 .1 .04 .04 .06
Inactivity
Treatment 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0747∗∗∗ 0.0229 0.0657∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0114) (0.0203) (0.0216) (0.0178)
Observations 22,507 6,666 15,841 3,489 19,018
Pre-Policy Mean .17 .08 .2 .09 .18
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-
2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗:
0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01.
Each coefficient represents a separate regression. All regressions include a linear trend which can be
different on each side of the discontinuity, partnership/marital status, age gap (× couple), non-married
children in household (0/1), west Germany, German, age fixed effects, and a constant.
evens out differences in retirement rates across subgroups. When considering the substi-
tution effects into employment, unemployment, and inactivity, we find more pronounced
differences between the groups. For single women, we find a large and positive employ-
ment effect of about 7.5 percentage points, which clearly exceeds the positive effect on
inactivity (about 2.5 percentage points); the effect on unemployment is not significantly
different from zero. In contrast, for women in couple households, all substitution effects
are significant and the size of the increase in employment and inactivity is, with about
9 and 7.5 percentage points, comparable. The effect on unemployment is, with one per-
centage point, clearly smaller but significant. The differences by education are similar.
Women with higher education compensate a large share of the negative retirement effect
by an increase in employment. This is different for women with low or medium educa-
tion: only about half of the reduction in retirement results in an increase in employment,
the combined effect on inactivity and unemployment has, with more than 8 percentage
points, the same magnitude for this group.
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The heterogeneous effects by marital status and education point at two important
mechanisms that can explain heterogeneity in female labor market effects. First, the large
substitution effect into inactivity among women in couples, which is significantly smaller
for single women, is consistent with household income affecting substitution patterns.
The results suggest that women in couple households are more likely to substitute into
inactivity as they can rely on the income of their partner in the household context.
Second, we find a stronger substitution effect into employment for women with higher
education compared to women with lower education; to a large extent, the latter group
enters inactivity or unemployment. The lower substitution effect into employment can
be related to higher employment restrictions due to labor market constraints or more
health demanding occupations for women without high education, or can be explained
by higher preferences for leisure time. In the following, we study heterogeneous effects
on the household level to learn more about these mechanisms.
In Table 7, we focus only on women in couple households. In addition to the average
effects for couples (Column 1), we show the effects by the partners’ retirement status and
earnings. The heterogeneity of the substitution pattern for the reduction in retirement
underlines the role of the safety net provided by the partner’s income. Substitution
effects into employment are not significant for women when the partner is not retired
(Column 3) or relatively low (5 percentage points) when the partner has high income
(Column 5). For these groups, the effect on inactivity dominates; inactivity increases
by between 8 and 9 percentage points in these subgroups. In contrast, the employment
effects are clearly dominating for women with a retired partner (12.4 percentage points)
or for women with a low income partner (12.5 percentage points). Moreover, we find
a relatively large and significant increase of 2.4 percentage points in unemployment for
women with a low income partner. This substitution pattern suggests that, on average,
women in these groups cannot or only partly rely on other income in the household and,
therefore, these women increase employment.
To better understand the lower substitution effects into employment for women with
high partner income or without higher education, we further differentiate the labor mar-
ket effects and split the results for women with low or high income partners by female
education (Table 8). We find strong employment effects for women with and without
higher education when the partner income is low. This underlines again the important
role of household income. However, the relative size of the employment effect differs by
education. For women without higher education, we find at the same time a sizable sub-
stitution effect into unemployment and inactivity while for women with higher education
and low income partners these effects are smaller and not significant. This different pat-
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects by household characteristics
Sample Couples Partner ret Partner not ret Low P.Inc High P.Inc
Retirement
Treatment -0.1745∗∗∗ -0.1881∗∗∗ -0.1523∗∗∗ -0.2048∗∗∗ -0.1422∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0263) (0.0189) (0.0306) (0.0187)
Observations 15,841 8,607 7,234 7,781 8,060
Pre-Policy Mean .36 .42 .29 .4 .32
Employment
Treatment 0.0872∗∗∗ 0.1235∗∗∗ 0.0393 0.1253∗∗∗ 0.0524∗
(0.0242) (0.0297) (0.0262) (0.0303) (0.0292)
Observations 15,841 8,607 7,234 7,781 8,060
Pre-Policy Mean .4 .34 .47 .39 .4
Unemployment
Treatment 0.0126∗ -0.0007 0.0285∗ 0.0237∗∗ 0.0013
(0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0154) (0.0108) (0.0090)
Observations 15,841 8,607 7,234 7,781 8,060
Pre-Policy Mean .04 .04 .05 .07 .02
Inactivity
Treatment 0.0747∗∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗ 0.0844∗∗∗ 0.0558∗∗ 0.0885∗∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0224) (0.0281) (0.0217) (0.0302)
Observations 15,841 8,607 7,234 7,781 8,060
Pre-Policy Mean .2 .2 .2 .14 .26
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-
2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗:
0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01.
Each coefficient represents a separate regression. All regressions include a linear trend which can be
different on each side of the discontinuity, age gap (× couple), non-married children in household (0/1),
high education (0/1), west Germany, German, age fixed effects, and a constant.
tern reinforces the role of differential labor market opportunities and leisure preferences
by education.
For highly educated women with high income partners, the results show no clear sub-
stitution pattern, the substitution effects into different labor market states are not sig-
nificant, yet the point estimates suggest that these women substitute mainly into em-
ployment and inactivity. In contrast, we find a larger increase in inactivity for women
with high income partners but without high education. These women face less favor-
able employment opportunities. At the same time, they benefit from high income at the
household level, which makes substitution into inactivity affordable.
To summarize, we document sizable labor market effects of an increase in the ERA for
women, which strongly differ by subgroups. Most importantly, our results show larger
employment effects for women who cannot or only partly rely on other income on the
household level, i.e. single women, women with a low income partner, and women with a
retired partner. Further, we find lower employment effects for women without higher ed-
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Table 8: Heterogeneous effects by household characteristics II
Sample Low partner income (LIP) High partner income (HIP)
LIP, no high educ. LIP, high educ. HIP, no high educ. HIP, high educ.
Retirement
Treatment -0.2094∗∗∗ -0.1794∗∗∗ -0.1466∗∗∗ -0.1199∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0531) (0.0212) (0.0556)
Observations 6,697 1,084 6,770 1,290
Employment
Treatment 0.1208∗∗∗ 0.1537∗∗ 0.0548∗ 0.0517
(0.0310) (0.0602) (0.0311) (0.0460)
Observations 6,697 1,084 6,770 1,290
Unemployment
Treatment 0.0315∗∗∗ -0.0282 -0.0017 0.0123
(0.0109) (0.0264) (0.0100) (0.0137)
Observations 6,697 1,084 6,770 1,290
Inactivity
Treatment 0.0571∗∗ 0.0539 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.0559
(0.0214) (0.0390) (0.0312) (0.0515)
Observations 6,697 1,084 6,770 1,290
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-2015,
own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗: 0.05,
∗∗∗: 0.01. Unemployed = non-employed, with ALG/ALGII. Inactive = non-employed, without ALG/ALGII.
Each coefficient represents a separate regression. All regressions include a linear trend which can be different
on each side of the discontinuity, age gap (× couple), non-married children in household (0/1), west Germany,
German, age fixed effects, and a constant.
ucation. As discussed above, this pattern is consistent with labor market constraints that
are higher for women without higher education or potentially higher leisure preferences
of these women.
6. Results – distributional effects
To evaluate the pension reform, it is crucial to go beyond a description of the labor
market effects. It is key to understand the implication of the pension reform for the
women’s own and household income. Therefore, in this final section, we focus on the
distributional effects of the reform.
The size and the sign of the income effects are ambiguous and depend strongly on the
labor market effects: Female and household income increase with positive employment
effects as labor earnings tend to be larger than pension income. In contrast, income will
decrease if inactivity increases. The income effect of an increase in unemployment is small
and depends on the working history. If women are eligible for insurance based unemploy-
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ment benefits (ALG I), their income in unemployment is very similar to pension income.
If they receive means-tested transfers (ALG II) instead, the income in unemployment
can be markedly lower.
In Tables 9, 10, and 11, we present the estimation results of Equation 1 for female
income (first panel) and household income (second panel) on average and for the sub-
groups defined above. All regressions include linear time trends and covariates. In line
with the descriptive results in Table 2 and graphical evidence (Figure A.1 in Appendix),
we do not find a significant change in female and household income for the full sample.
Relative to the pre-policy means, the point estimates suggest small reductions in income,
about 3% for female income and about 2% for household income.
Despite the sizable heterogeneity of the labor market effects for the subgroups, we
find very small differences in the income effects. For most of the subgroups, we find
insignificant and rather small effects. Important exceptions are women with higher edu-
cation (Column 4 in Table 9) and women with a non-retired partner (Column 4 in Table
10). For these women we find a significant negative effect on the household level. As
documented above, a large share of women with non-retired partners substitutes into in-
activity, which explain an income effect on the household level. We find a similar pattern
for women with high income partners (Column 6 in Table 10), yet results are not signifi-
cant. Women with high education have, on average, larger pension claims. This explains
why this group faces large negative income effects. These negative effects are partly
reduced by the positive employment effects; however, as substitution into inactivity and
unemployment dominate, the group specific effect is negative.
For the policy discussion, the implication of an increase in the ERA for the incomes
of the most vulnerable groups is of particular importance. Therefore, we turn to results
of women without higher education with low income partners. Our results in Table
11 (Column 1) show a relatively small and not significant reduction in income for this
group. This is remarkable, as for women without higher education and low partner
income we find in addition to positive employment effects large substitution effects into
unemployment and inactivity (see Table 8). This finding suggests that other transfer
programs, such as unemployment benefits and means-tested transfers, provide an income
substitution for the loss of pension income.20
In Table 12, we provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis. Specifically, we show
20The micro census does not include information about the previous labor market status. Therefore,
we can not identify women unemployed or inactive in the previous period and we cannot analyse
the effect for this specific vulnerable group. According to Geyer and Welteke (2017) there is almost
no active substitution into different employment states in response to the reform, therefore only
few unemployed or inactive women make a transition into employment and can compensate for the
income loss with labor earnings.
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estimation results of the pension reform on different transfer programs by education using
Equation 1. We find a significant and sizable program substitution effect of the pension
reform on the take up of means-tested transfers (ALG II).
Table 9: Heterogeneous income effects by individual characteristics
Main Singles Couples High educ. Not high educ.
Own income
Treatment -31.0397 14.5950 -52.8691 -124.0881 -14.2086
(28.3798) (35.4162) (33.1030) (79.9688) (27.4204)
Observations 22,507 6,666 15,841 3,489 19,018
Pre-policy mean 933 1258 795 1348 855
Household income
Treatment -39.8406 18.5347 -50.8412 -239.5914∗∗ -2.0217
(44.7836) (51.6606) (56.4835) (107.0604) (52.5363)
Observations 22,507 6,666 15,841 3,489 19,018
Pre-policy mean 2365 1471 2746 2896 2264
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus,
2011-2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗:
0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01.
Each coefficient represents a separate regression. All regressions include a linear trend which can
be different on each side of the discontinuity, partnership/marital status, age gap (× couple), non-
married children in household (0/1), high education (0/1), west Germany, German, age fixed effects,
and a constant.
Table 10: Heterogeneous income effects by household characteristics
Couples Partner ret Partner not ret Low P.Inc High P.Inc
Own income
Treatment -52.8691 -18.8406 -93.5208∗ -32.6290 -70.0558
(33.1030) (31.8152) (45.2331) (34.3465) (45.6428)
Observations 15,841 8,607 7,234 7,781 8,060
Pre-policy mean 795 768 828 807 783
Household income
Treatment -50.8412 28.2769 -186.4326∗ -57.7038 -88.1367
(56.4835) (51.3130) (101.9515) (41.6194) (93.9426)
Observations 15,841 8,607 7,234 7,781 8,060
Pre-policy mean 2746 2391 3180 1989 3523
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-
2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗:
0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01.
Each coefficient represents a separate regression. All regressions include a linear trend which can be
different on each side of the discontinuity, partnership/marital status, age gap (× couple), non-married
children in household (0/1), high education (0/1), west Germany, German, age fixed effects, and a
constant.
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Table 11: Heterogeneous income effects by household characteristics II
Low P.Inc, low educ Low P.Inc, high educ High P.Inc, low educ High P.Inc, high educ
Own income
Treatment -19.0772 -147.3819 -48.1854 -175.7517
(34.7809) (99.7550) (43.9274) (164.5550)
Observations 6,697 1,084 6,770 1,290
Household income
Treatment -27.5690 -256.4657 -56.9987 -293.9122
(36.9036) (154.1001) (110.9918) (230.1878)
Observations 6,697 1,084 6,770 1,290
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗: 0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01.
Each coefficient represents a separate regression. All regressions include a linear trend which can be different on each side of
the discontinuity, age gap (× couple), non-married children in household (0/1), west Germany, German, age fixed effects, and
a constant.
Table 12: Social benefit receipt
Not high education High education
Average Low part. inc. High part. inc. Average Low part. inc. High part. inc.
ALG
Treatment -0.0022 -0.0033 -0.0014 0.0017 -0.0217 0.0147
(0.0041) (0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0104) (0.0205) (0.0130)
Observations 19,018 6,697 6,770 3,489 1,084 1,290
ALG II
Treatment 0.0207∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.0003 -0.0041 -0.0183 -0.0044
(0.0082) (0.0100) (0.0014) (0.0141) (0.0273) (0.0040)
Observations 19,018 6,697 6,770 3,489 1,084 1,290
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗: 0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01.
Each coefficient represents a separate regression. All regressions include a linear trend which can be different on each side of the discontinuity,
age gap (× couple), non-married children in household (0/1), west Germany, age fixed effects, German, and a constant.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we use an RDD to evaluate the 1999 pension reform in Germany. Specifi-
cally, we estimate the ITT effects of a substantial 3-year increase in the ERA for women
on different labor market outcomes. Using German micro census data allows us to con-
duct an in-depth analysis of heterogeneity patterns along individual and household char-
acteristics. In addition, we study the distributional implications of the reform at the
household level.
Our findings show that the reform led to a substantial reduction in retirement as
well as increasing employment, unemployment, and inactivity rates. We further show
that there is considerable heterogeneity in these effects along individual and household
characteristics. Labor market opportunities and the financial situation of the partner
seem to play key roles in shaping the individual responses to the pension reform. These
results underline the importance of considering the household context when evaluating
pension reforms. In addition, we show that there are no significant spillover effects on
the partners of the affected women.
In the last part of our analysis, we show that, on average, there are no significant
effects on own or household net income. Our subgroup analysis further shows that
even financially vulnerable groups, such as single or low educated women, do not suffer
significant negative income effects. Our findings suggest that this result is partly related
to program substitution from pensions to means-tested out of work transfers. Thus the
safety net provided by the German transfer system serves as a buffer against income
losses for subgroups who are at particular risk of old age poverty.
Our findings about the heterogeneous employment and distributional effects on the
household level extend the previous literature which has so far mainly focused on the
individual level. When designing and reforming the pension system it is important to
better understand the heterogeneous response pattern and how household net income –
across the income distribution and for specific vulnerable groups – is affected.
For a final evaluation of the pension reform future research is important. For the
groups who prolong their working lives in response to the reform, the reform implies
large cuts to leisure time which might reduce utility for the individuals and, therefore,
the overall welfare of the society. At the same time, also non-market work, such as the
provision of child care, long-term care, or social engagement, might also be crowded out
by an increase in employment.
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Employed Retired Unemployed Inactive
Quad. Lin. Cub. Quad. Lin. Cub. Quad. Lin. Cub. Quad. Lin. Cub.
Treatment 0.0896∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.1120∗∗∗ -0.1969∗∗∗ -0.1608∗∗∗ -0.1897∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗ 0.0170∗∗ 0.0152 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0187) (0.0339) (0.0206) (0.0148) (0.0314) (0.0099) (0.0071) (0.0132) (0.0186) (0.0163) (0.0178)
Running variable -0.0007 0.0012 -0.0126 0.0099 -0.0013 0.0095 0.0001 0.0004 0.0050 -0.0092∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0018
(0.0076) (0.0016) (0.0225) (0.0065) (0.0019) (0.0192) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0087) (0.0033) (0.0011) (0.0134)
Running × Treatment 0.0018 0.0006 0.0040 -0.0049 0.0005 -0.0138 -0.0037 -0.0012 -0.0074 0.0069 0.0001 0.0172
(0.0087) (0.0023) (0.0257) (0.0069) (0.0022) (0.0197) (0.0042) (0.0011) (0.0112) (0.0066) (0.0021) (0.0196)
Running2 -0.0001 -0.0023 0.0009∗ 0.0008 -0.0000 0.0009 -0.0007∗∗ 0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0002) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0025)
(Running × Treatment)2 0.0002 0.0047 -0.0014∗∗ 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0009 -0.0047
(0.0007) (0.0050) (0.0005) (0.0036) (0.0003) (0.0022) (0.0005) (0.0041)
Running3 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
(Running × Treatment)3 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Observations 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507 22,507
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels: ∗: 0.10, ∗∗: 0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01. Unemployed = non-employed, with ALG/ALGII. Inactive =
non-employed, without ALG/ALGII.
All regressions include partnership/marital status, age gap (× couple), non-married children in household (0/1), high education (0/1), west Germany, German, age fixed effects, and a
constant.
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Table A.2: Treatment effects 2-year window, 61 year old women only
Employed Retired Unemployed Inactive
Treatment 0.0897∗∗∗ -0.1710∗∗∗ 0.0171∗∗ 0.0642∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0124) (0.0072) (0.0107)
Running variable 0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Running × treatment 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Observations 14,954 14,954 14,954 14,954
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder,
Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
Robust standard errors in parentheses - clustered on month of birth. Significance levels:
∗: 0.10, ∗∗: 0.05, ∗∗∗: 0.01.
Each coefficient represents a separate regression. All regressions include partner-
ship/marital status, age gap (× couple), non-married children in household (0/1), high
education (0/1), west Germany, German, and a constant.





































Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, Mikrozensus, 2011-2015, own calculations.
31
